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What Belgium Can Do:  
Proposals for the National Security Strategy 
Sven Biscop & Nina Wilén
Belgium has never had a National 
Security Strategy: a single strategic vision 
outlining how to safeguard its national 
interests from external threats and 
challenges and to prevent the exploitation 
of its internal vulnerabilities. Many in 
Belgium intuitively feel that none is 
needed: Are we not shielded by the EU 
and NATO? And what could the world 
expect from this small country anyway? 
But the fact is that the Kingdom of 
Belgium is not such a small player. The 
geopolitical heart, and the host, of the EU, 
it ranks 9th out of 27 in terms of 
population and GDP; worldwide, it is the 
12th exporting country. Hence recurring 
tensions between Belgium’s own – often 
low – level of ambition as a security actor 
and the expectations of its allies and 
partners.  
 
On many international threats and challenges 
Belgium evidently cannot, and should not, act 
alone. In many cases it will act as a member of the 
EU, or through NATO or the UN, or sometimes 
through an ad hoc coalition. But if Belgium wants 
these multilateral players to act timely and 
adequately, and take specific Belgian interests 
into account, it must push them into action. It 
must define its priorities for these international 
organisations, identify the right course of action, 
and convince likeminded states to join initiatives 
under the most relevant flag. However, other 
states and organisations will only rally around a 
credible actor: one who first of all takes his own 
security and defence seriously. On specific issues, 
or when international organisations fail to act, 
Belgium will, of course, still undertake national 
action. That is why Belgium too needs a National 
Security Strategy.  
 
At times, Belgium has played a leading role in 
security and defence. On issues that clearly 
concern its interests, on which it has expertise, 
and on which it is willing to make a significant 
contribution, it can be in the vanguard, including 
on the international scene. But for more than a 
decade now, it has not been, mostly because it 
was absorbed by domestic issues. The security 
environment has changed, however, and internal 
vulnerabilities are now immediately exploited by 
 
 





external powers. Therefore, even as the pandemic 
has created enormous domestic challenges, 
Belgium cannot afford to be only inward-looking.  
 
In its 2020 coalition agreement, the federal 
government clearly intended to mark a new start; 
hence the initiative to adopt a National Security 
Strategy, for the first time ever. In this policy 
brief, we outline Belgium’s interests, role, 
objectives, and capabilities against the backdrop 
of the current security environment, pointing at 
what the National Security Strategy could, and 
ultimately should, encompass.  
 
WHAT IS A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY? 
A National Security Strategy operates at the level 
of “Grand Strategy”: it concerns the internal 
cohesion of our society and the very survival of 
our chosen way of life – which is based on 
democracy, equality, human rights, and the rule 
of law. Such a strategy has five components:  
 
(1) Vital interests: The starting point is the definition 
of the interests that have to be guaranteed to ensure 
our societal cohesion and way of life.  
 
(2)  The security environment: Next comes an 
assessment of the threats and challenges to the 
country’s vital interests. This analysis looks ahead 
to the longer term (10 to 20 years), taking into 
account that “black swans” may occur: unexpected 
events with major consequences.  
 
(3)  Role: The Strategy then outlines the type of 
long-term role that the state seeks to play as a 
security actor on its territory and on the 
international scene, in order to safeguard its vital 
interests from these threats and challenges. For 
example, states can see themselves primarily as 
faithful allies or independent players; as bridge-
builders or antagonists; as value-based or 
transactional; as defensive and reactive – focused 
on resilience – or assertive and proactive, with the 
ambition to shape the international environment.  
 
(4)  Objectives: Arguing back from that long-term 
vision, the Strategy next translates it into a set of 
short and medium term, concrete objectives, 
both for the next 5 years, i.e. the current 
legislature, and for the next 10 years. It allocates 
responsibility for each objective to a specific 
actor, and sets deadlines.  
 
(5)  Capabilities: The Strategy outlines the types of 
instruments that the government plans to put to 
use, within and outside Belgian territory, in order 
to pursue these objectives. On that basis, it then 
gives an indication of the budgets, personnel, 
civilian and military capabilities, and other means 
to be allocated to the relevant departments during 
the current legislature and of the long-term 
budgetary growth path.  
 
A National Security Strategy is not a catalogue or 
wish-list: it does not need to say something about 
every imaginable item of policy. A short and 
sharp National Security Strategy focuses on a few 
priorities: the big projects that this government 
aspires to sustain, complete or set on the rails. 
Within its framework, departmental strategies 
can be elaborated, such as an updated Strategic 
Vision on Defence and perhaps a Diplomatic 
Strategic Vision. The details are for the annual 
policy statements of individual Ministers.  
 
Such a National Security Strategy would basically 
offer a narrative, for the Belgian public and 
parliament, for its allies and partners, and for all 
potential adversaries: What are Belgium’s 
priorities, and what can they count on Belgium 












BELGIUM’S INTERESTS  
The vital interests of Belgium are:  
(1)  The physical security of our citizens and 
territory;  
(2)  The democratic and sovereign nature of our 
political system;  
(3)  Our economic prosperity and how that is 
equitably shared between citizens;  
(4)  A rules-based international order, so as to 
create a stable environment;  
(5)  The effective functioning of the EU, in which 
we have pooled key elements of our sovereignty.  
 
The first four are, in fact, the vital interests of the 
EU as a whole as codified in the 2016 EU Global 
Strategy. For Belgium, the consolidation and, 
where necessary, further deepening of EU 
integration as such must be added as a vital 
interest.  
 
Vital interests are what we must be prepared to 
take risks for when they are threatened, for 
otherwise our entire society and way of life will 
be at risk. If necessary, this is what we are ready 
to fight for. 
 
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
Security is a continuum; internal and external threats 
are closely interlinked and at times overlapping.  
 
There are, however, threats that are primarily internal, 
for which the domestic security services are the first 
responder. Examples are crime, domestic political 
extremism and violence, and domestically inspired 
terrorism. When necessary, our domestic security 
services cooperate with their foreign counterparts, for 
example to address international crime. These internal 
threats are primarily addressed by the Framework 
Note on Integral Security (which is in fact due for an 
update itself).  
 
The National Security Strategy concerns threats that 
are primarily external, as well as the exploitation of 
internal vulnerabilities by foreign actors for strategic 
purposes. Examples are subversion, coercion, and 
aggression by other states (including in cyber space), 
international terrorism, and armed conflict, but also 
transversal challenges such as climate change, 
epidemics, economic crisis, and resource shortages. 
National, regional, and global analyses of the security 
context are regularly updated: Belgium conducted a 
Security Environment Review in 2019, and the EU 
just finished an assessment in November 2020, as the 
first step towards the drafting of a “Strategic 
Compass” for its Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP). NATO systematically monitors the 
security environment too. Taken together, these 
analyses enable Belgium to situate its national security 
needs and assess threats and challenges on both the 
national and the regional level. 
 
Undergirding any proactive approach to address 
security threats across the entire internal-external 
continuum, is resilience: the ability of the state and 
society to continue to function and remain relevant in 
the face of sudden shocks as well as structural changes 
in the environment. Building strong cyber defences, 
for example, is a question of resilience, and protects 
against both a criminal gang hacking bank data and 
Russian or Chinese induced cyber activities. Actively 
putting an end to these threats will further require a 
domestic policing strategy for the former; and a Russia 
or China strategy in the context of the National 
Security Strategy for the latter.  
 
The existence of a single National Security Council 
and its subordinate bodies, the Strategic Committee 
and the Coordination Committee for Intelligence and 
Security, ought to ensure full transparency and 
coordination between these three overlapping 
dimensions: dealing proactively with internal and 
external threats and challenges while ensuring 
resilience.  
 
The vital interests and the broad security threats are 
more or less identical for all EU Member States. Yet, 
 
 





it is important to note Belgium’s specific interests and 
vulnerabilities, which ought to determine its priority 
objectives. Belgium notably is the host country of EU 
and NATO institutions; one of the world’s most open 
economies, with relatively few important national 
economic decision-making centres left, but with 
major centres of excellence in specific sectors; a 
forerunner in human rights (notably on gender 
equality and LGBTQIA+ rights); a federal state with 
complex decision-making procedures; and a former 
colonial power in Central Africa. 
 
BELGIUM’S LONG-TERM ROLE 
Which role does Belgium see for itself in a world that 
is dominated by increasing tensions between 
continent-sized great powers and a weakening of 
multilateral cooperation, as well as by a decline of 
respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of 
law? Belgium could play three broad roles:  
 
(1)  A resilient state and a “good host” for the EU and 
NATO: Belgium must protect democracy, respect for 
human rights, and the rule of law, including within the 
EU and NATO as a whole. To that end, Belgium 
should aspire to be at the forefront of creative and 
resolute measures to protect not only national but also 
EU and NATO decision-making from attempts at 
subversion by outside powers. Overall, in every policy, 
domestic or foreign, Belgium ought to uphold and 
promote these values. 
 
(2)  A reliable EU Member State and NATO Ally: The 
coalition agreement states that Belgium “resolutely 
chooses for an explicitly pro-European attitude”. 
Belgium’s role should be that of an active promotor 
of EU integration. Integration is not an end in itself 
but must be pursued where the EU and its Member 
States are otherwise no longer capable of governing 
effectively or of defending their interests vis-à-vis the 
outside world. On defence specifically, the coalition 
agreement adds that “Belgium will continue to 
reinforce its commitment to an effective European 
defence. This contributes to a real European strategy 
and autonomy and thus reinforces the ‘European 
pillar’ within NATO”. Belgium should therefore 
assume a leading role and invest in its armed forces 
while advancing EU defence integration. 
 
(3)  An active bridge-builder for global peace and stability: 
Brussels is one of the diplomatic capitals of the world, 
which provides Belgium with a unique opportunity to 
promote dialogue and cooperation between the great 
powers, whose leaders regularly meet with the EU and 
NATO. Making use of the opportunity for bilateral 
contacts that these meetings imply, Belgium should 
make a consistent plea at the highest level for 
multilateralism and constructive great power relations. 
Under the heading “Fostering Consensus, Acting for 
Peace”, the motto of its 2019-2020 Security Council 
membership, Belgium should continue to actively 
pursue multilateral solutions for specific international 
threats and challenges. 
 
BELGIUM’S OBJECTIVES 
A concrete objective that the National Security 
Strategy could set is a review of Belgium’s resilience, 
paying special attention to its host nation role. The 
base-line national resilience requirements that NATO 
has set in 7 sectors can serve as benchmarks: 
continuity of government, energy, population 
movement, food and water resources, civil 
communications, transport systems, and the capacity 
to handle mass casualties. In a next step, priority 
actions to remedy the most important gaps must be 
identified. This is especially important as all areas are 
interconnected: deficits in one area may affect 
another.  The country will also have to make choices 
about which degree of autonomy it desires in terms 
of decision-making, expertise and technology, and 
production capacity, in which specific sectors, at the 
national or the EU level. The coronavirus pandemic 
highlighted the lack of autonomy in certain medical 











A worldwide level economic playing field and 
productive trade and investment relations are crucial 
for Belgium’s vital interests.  At the EU level, the first 
common measures have been taken to prevent 
foreign actors from gaining undue influence and 
from distorting the market (such as investment 
screening), while pushing for reciprocity in market 
opening with countries like China. As an open 
economy, Belgium should aim to put proposals on 
the table for further firm but balanced measures. In 
both the EU and NATO, Belgium should contribute 
to the debate on how to apply deterrence to 
subversion, or how to retaliate when it fails. It could 
promote a solidarity-based approach: a cyber-attack 
on one should be seen a cyber-attack on all, for 
example, and ought to imply a joint reaction.  
 
As a bridge-builder in international politics, Belgium 
should enhance its profile within the Alliance for 
Multilateralism, a network of states created by 
France and Germany that seeks to promote strong 
and effective multilateral cooperation. Belgium could 
take the lead on specific issues and use its convening 
power to host results-oriented seminars in Brussels. 
Might Brussels, the diplomatic centre of Europe, 
become the hub of the Alliance for Multilateralism?  
 
In the area of defence, the Belgian armed forces must 
maintain significant contributions to expeditionary 
operations in an EU, NATO, UN, and/or coalition 
framework to support collective security. The annual 
review of Belgium’s operational deployments, which 
should be a joint undertaking of Foreign Affairs, 
Defence, and Development, must not only focus on 
which ongoing operations to contribute to, but also on 
which operations ought to be ended or reoriented, and 
which potential future crisis scenarios might demand 
new deployments. Where necessary, Belgium must 
open the debate in the EU or NATO.  
 
The National Security Strategy will have to address 
the overall balance between, on the one hand, 
Belgium’s high-profile bilateral military cooperation 
(such as with Niger) and, on the other hand, joining 
in multinational operations, to ensure that they 
reinforce rather than undermine each other. Military 
engagement only goes so far, however. Any review 
must include the political and economic dimensions 
as well, including development cooperation; in these 
too, Belgium should continue to play its part, and 
implement a comprehensive approach where 
possible.  
 
At the same time, in view of increasing great power 
rivalry, deterrence and territorial defence have 
regained importance again. The National Security 
Strategy ought to state that (collective) territorial 
defence and collective security through 
expeditionary operations are the two core missions 
of Belgian defence, therefore. “Help to the nation” 
in emergencies remains a supplementary task, which 
is undertaken when necessary with the capabilities 
available, but for which no specific defence 
capabilities are acquired.  
 
Another dimension that the National Security 
Strategy could look into is the freedom of access to 
the global commons (the seas, the skies, space, and 
cyber space). Does Belgium have a specific 
contribution to make, for example in the area of 
maritime security, given that the port of Antwerp is 
the second-largest European seaport?   
 
In the short term, Belgium must play an active role and 
promote its national preferences in the debates about the 
EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept, 
both of which are due in 2022. This way, Belgium 
ensures that its national interests are embedded in 
multilateral structures for the long term.  
 
BELGIUM’S CAPABILITIES  
Heeding the unanimous call from all branches of 
government for a comprehensive or integrated 
approach, the National Security Strategy must address 









The Strategy should envisage an increase in Belgium’s 
diplomatic capacity, which has been suffering budget 
cuts for many years, as well as in the capacity of 
development cooperation, including the Belgian 
development agency, ENABEL. The intelligence 
services also stand out as deserving renewed attention: 
when compared to other European countries, Belgium’s 
capacity is woefully small. The focus on resilience, and 
the need for the armed forces to re-prioritise territorial 
defence while maintaining expeditionary operations, will 
demand a reassessment of the role and organisation of 
the police, and a reinvestment in civil protection.  
 
Implications for the private sector and academia must be 
assessed as well, notably in the context of strategic 
autonomy in research and technology. The coalition 
agreement also highlighted the importance of the 
security and defence industry. The National Security 
Strategy should put forward how Belgium seeks to draw 
on the EU’s European Defence Fund (EDF) and 
announce the necessary national mechanisms to that 
end. Furthermore, the Strategy could stress the role of 
Belgium’s national think-tanks in supporting decision-
making by providing policy-relevant research and 
influencing the international debate.  
 
The National Security Strategy certainly has to address 
the development of Belgian defence. The benchmark 
for Belgium’s current budgetary target of 1.3% of GDP 
by 2030 was the average of the non-nuclear European 
members of NATO – but that average has meanwhile 
already surpassed 1.5%. Given that Belgium’s defence 
expenditure is only just above 1% of GDP, the Belgian 
growth path will have to be re-assessed, therefore, to 
ensure that Belgium can stay militarily relevant. At the 
same time, a percentage of GDP is a very arbitrary 
metric, particularly in times when the GDP has shrunk 
in the wake of the corona crisis. The real aim should be 
to ensure sufficient funding to meet Belgium’s agreed 
capability targets as well as to use the capability whenever 
needed to remain a credible partner.  
 
 
In terms of military capabilities, Belgium maintains a 
combat capacity in each of the components of the 
armed forces. This allows the country to act whenever 
the government wants to act; not alone, but in all 
possible scenarios, Belgium ought to remain able to 
make an important contribution to a coalition. Far-
reaching cooperation and integration with partner 
countries have been a pre-condition to maintain the 
current range of forces. The National Security Strategy 
should make a principled choice to deepen cooperation 
and integration, such as in the context of Belgian-Dutch 
naval cooperation, the CaMo project (Capacité Motorisée) 
between the Belgian and French land forces, and the 
Belgian-Dutch-Danish Special Operations Command, 
but also for the future F35 capability.  
 
Belgium’s investment in major new platforms for all 
components is an opportunity to pursue further 
integration from a position of strength and thus play a 
leading role in Belgium’s areas of choice. Such military 
integration between states could be building-blocks of 
the EU’s goal of building a comprehensive full-spectrum 
force package via Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO). By investing in its armed forces and in their 
integration with partners, Belgium could contribute 
some of PESCO’s core building-blocks and assume a 
prominent role in its further development.  
 
The updated Strategic Version 2040 and future iterations 
of the Military Programming Law will need to detail these 
commitments. 
 
WHO IMPLEMENTS A NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY?  
The adoption of the first National Security Strategy is 
an opportunity to reinforce the decision-making 
apparatus and facilitate coordination and cooperation 
between all relevant branches of government, with an 
eye to decisive action. This demands a change in 
mindset on the part of all involved: interagency should 
be a permanent mode of operating, not something 









The core of the system is the National Security 
Council, chaired by the Prime Minister – national 
security is indeed Chefsache. The Royal Decree of 22 
December 2020 added the Chief of Defence to the 
Coordination Committee under the Council as a 
permanent member. In view of the need for a 
comprehensive approach of the international 
dimension, the Minister for Development 
Cooperation should be added to the Council so that 
diplomacy, defence, and development (the “three 
D’s”) are all directly represented. Furthermore, the 
Regions and Communities must be involved in a 
more structural way, for example by planning regular 
meetings and/or creating working groups on specific 
topics. Their contribution to resilience in particular is 
indispensable.  
 
For the first time, the Prime Minister’s private office 
(cabinet) includes a chef de cabinet for foreign and security 
policy. This de facto “national security advisor” acts as 
the linchpin for policy preparation; the position ought 
to become a structural feature.  
 
A section in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister 
assures the secretariat of the National Security 
Council. The secretariat could be reinforced, notably 
with a capacity for strategic foresight analysis, in order 
to systematically feed the National Security Council 
with a permanent rolling analysis of the security 
environment, thus ensuring continuous finetuning of 
policy and action while building an institutional 
memory. In the future, a regrouping of existing 
bodies, such as the National Crisis Centre, the 
Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) and 
others may have to be considered.   
 
CONCLUSION: WHO WRITES A NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY?   
Committing to writing a National Security 
Strategy implies committing to reviewing the 
Strategy every 5 years; a one-off exercise would 
be pointless. While finetuning of implementation 
ought to be continuous, a 5-yearly review must 
ensure the validity of the objectives and a new 
impetus by each successive government. The first 
Belgian National Security Strategy will set an 
important precedent, therefore, not only in terms 
of substance but also in terms of the drafting 
method. Key to the success of a strategy is that all 
those who have to contribute to its implementation, 
feel ownership of it.  
 
On the one hand, there can in the end be only 
one pen-holder, appointed by the Prime Minister, 
with a small drafting team drawn from relevant 
parts of the government, in particular the 
intelligence services, foreign affairs, 
development, and defence. The regional 
governments must naturally be involved as well.  
 
On the other hand, however, the drafters must 
consult broadly and stimulate public debate. The 
cohesion of society is a key element of national 
security. Making sure that the National Security 
Strategy is representative of all Belgians is not 
only important from the point of view of 
democratic decision-making, therefore; trust in 
the public institutions also directly strengthens 
the capacity to address security crises. A debate 
in the federal parliament seems evident. 
Representatives from academia, the private 
sector, and civil society could be involved in a 
series of closed and informal thematic 
roundtables during the drafting process, which 
the Egmont Institute could organise in support 
of the pen-holder. Once approved, the National 
Security Strategy ought to be publicised broadly; 
a high-profile launch event is a must.  
 
*** 
The seemingly most simple questions are always 
the most difficult ones: What is Belgium’s policy? 
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